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Mr. Levenberg's Criticism of the Final Report of
the Article 9 Review Committee: A Reply
Homer Kripke*
Charles R. Levenberg, Esq., has written in the Minnesota
Law Review1 a very critical article about the Final Report of the
Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.2 The article may have the effect of interposing an obsta-
cle to adoption of the Committee's proposals by the states that
have adopted the Code. The article is thus a very serious mat-
ter.
It would be natural for a reply to such an article to be writ-
ten by the Reporter for the Committee, who was Professor
Robert Braucher of the Harvard Law School. But now that
Professor Braucher is Mr. Justice Braucher of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it would be unseemly for him
to reply to the article with the sharpness that is appropriate
under the circumstances. Therefore, the task falls on me as As-
sociate Reporter for the Committee.
Mr. Levenberg's article is very little changed from the draft
he sent to me in the spring of 1971. He had brought to the at-
tention of the Reporters and Consultants to the Committee a
criticism of our draft rule for determining the governing law
as to perfection of security interests under Article 9 of the Code.
We had been persuaded that his criticism was valid and we had
made a corresponding change. I commended him then for his
useful criticism, and I am now glad to commend him again pub-
* Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Levenberg, Comments on. Certain Proposed Amendments to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 MN. L. REv. 117 (1971).
2. The Report is dated April 25, 1971 (hereinafter cited as the
Fr AL REPoRT). It is described by Carl R. Funk, Esq., a member of
the Committee and now Counsel to the Permanent Editorial Board for
The Uniform Commercial Code, in 26 Bus. LAw. 321 (1971).
The Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) appointed the Review Com-
mittee to consider Article 9 because of numerous nonuniform amend-
ments to Article 9. REPORT No. 3 oF THE PEB (1967) at X.
A revision of the FEAL REPORT reflecting subsequent action of
the sponsoring organizations, as described in the text at note 6 infra,
is on the press as this is written. It will be the new Official Draft of
Article 9 and is proposed to the states for adoption. It will be intro-
duced in some state legislatures in their 1972 sessions.
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licly. I then told him that I thought that the remainder of the
points in his draft article were trivial, and I still think so. Since
the tone of Mr. Levenberg's article offers the possibility that
he could do great harm to an important legal enterprise by leav-
ing the casual reader with the impression that there must be
substance when there is so much vehemence, it is necessary to
reply.
Of course, my strongly negative words will be justified only
if I demonstrate that the article lacks substance. I propose to
do this in Part II of the present article. But I must first in Part
I explain why it is necessary to deal with the Levenberg criti-
cisms.
I.
It is not that the product of the Review Committee is immune
from criticism. On the contrary, the Final Report will doubt-
lessly be criticized by many on many points. An excellent ex-
ample is the series of articles by Professor William D. Hawkland
running in the Commercial Law Journal as this is written.8 Pro-
fessor Hawkland is a recognized authority on commercial law
and on Article 9 in particular. His comments and criticisms go
beyond Mr. Levenberg's in substance and many of them offer
food for serious thought. But the stance of the criticism is dif-
ferent. Professor Hawkland recognizes the enormous difficul-
ties in achieving a uniform law that will satisfy everyone. He
also recognizes that the Review Committee's work on the whole
is an improvement and should be supported and is careful to
couch his criticism in such form that he will not disrupt a useful
program.
The achievement of progress in state law, where multi-state
transactions are involved and uniformity is necessary, is an ex-
tremely difficult task. The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has not had uniform success in
procuring the unanimous or substantial adoption of many of its
uniform laws by the states. The Uniform Commercial Code
3. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Part I: Financing the Farmer, 76 CoM. L.J. 416
(1971); Part II: Proceeds, 77 CoM. L.J. 12 (1972); Part III: Fixtures, 77
COM. L.J. 43 (1972); Part IV: The Scope of Article 9, 77 CoM. L.J. 79
(1972). Professor W. Hawkland is the author of the valuable A TRANS-
ACTION GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2 vol., 1964), which
deals with the existing Code. See also the appraisal of the FINAL REPORT
by Clifford Schuman, Esq., of the New York Bar, to appear in the 1971/
72 New York University Annual Survey of American Law.
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was one notable success of recent decades, having been rapidly
adopted by all states but Louisiana, and also by the Virgin Is-
lands and the District of Columbia. The National Conference has
also had great difficulty in keeping laws uniform when they
were improved by amendment, and the Code has already suf-
fered an unhappy experience. Some comparatively minor
amendments in 1962 were not adopted by all of the states which
had adopted the basic Code, and this failure to act on the amend-
ments detracted from uniformity. The present major revision of
Article 9 also carries the risk that it will detract from, rather
than add to, uniformity because if less than all of the states
adopt it, we will have two versions of what is supposed to be a
Uniform Commercial Code. Thus Mr. Levenberg's article con-
tains the threat of causing great harm to a vital legal effort.
Efforts to improve and unify state law by statute seem to me
to offer the most hopeful means for the future growth of the
law in technical fields. It is no disparagement of the courts to
say that the process of developing law in such fields by the case
method is too slow. Despite the incredible feats of some of our
great judges in keeping abreast of numerous technical fields, the
courts as a whole have difficulty in understanding in sophisti-
cated fashion the law of these fields. It is likewise no disparage-
ment of legislatures to say that the law has become too tech-
nical for the ordinary legislator. Thus it rests on select com-
mittees of the National Conference, of the American Law Insti-
tute, and of the bar associations to draft such statutes.4
To overcome the inertia of the state legislatures and to mod-
ernize and amend a statute uniformly once adopted is an even
greater task. To a large extent "lawyers' law" as distinguished
from political matters will be acted on only if there is little
or no opposition. The present effort to make a substantial change
in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and to have it done
so as to preserve rather than to destroy uniformity is a real test
of the process-the first such attempt in recent decades. Any
disagreement with the content of the proposed amendments
necessarily causes some disruption of the effort-an unjustified
disruption if the disagreement is not judicious in tone and well-
considered.
The organizational task of extensively revising a successful
4. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 Cowo. L. REv. 461
(1967); Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REv.
659 (1968). In support of the role of the courts, see Traynor, The Judges
and Law Reform, 5 TnmL 37 (Apr./May, 1969).
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uniform law in a technical field like Secured Transactions is not
a light burden. The American Law Institute selected two Re-
porters and a distinguished Review Committee of ten, including
judges, professors and practicing lawyers. The Committee had
as its Consultants the authors of the two leading treatises on
Article 9.5 All members of the group gave unstintingly of their
time over four years at many two and three-day meetings, be-
sides almost continual correspondence and study of drafts. When
the Committee finished its draft the work was reviewed in a
two-day session by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uni-
form Commercial Code and then in a two-day session by the
Council of the American Law Institute. Thereafter the work
was submitted on two different occasions to the full member-
ship of the American Law Institute and then to the full mem-
bership of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. None of these entities rubber-stamped the
draft presented to it, and each made some changes.0 The draft
was then approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association.
To have this enterprise rendered unsuccessful because of an
ill-considered attack would be a disaster to the law. Such a
program of revision could not easily be mounted again. The
American Law Institute endeavored to raise special funds for the
expected budget of this enterprise. It succeeded only in part,
and therefore the enterprise was a charge on the other funds
and projects of the Institute.
Of course, if the result is indeed bad, then no matter how
much effort and funds have been expended, the result ought not
to become law, and a further effort will have to be made when
and if the manpower and funds can again be assembled. If the
result is good, this kind of attack is most unfortunate. The ulti-
mate question is whether the attack is justified. To this ques-
tion I now turn.
II.
Two general comments may be made concerning the Com-
mittee's work regarding Mr. Levenberg's crticisms.
5. Professor Grant Gilmore of the University of Chicago Law
School and Peter F. Coogan, Esq., of the Massachusetts Bar, a frequent
lecturer at the Harvard and Yale Law Schools. See G. GILMORE, SE-
CURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (2 vol.; 1965); Coogan, Hogan
& Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code in
1 & 2 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE (1963).
6. See note 2 supra.
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First, the Committee was not writing on a clean slate.
Given the notable success of and basic satisfaction with Article
9 and its nearly unanimous adoption, the Committee was not free
to start over from scratch. It could not change the fundamental
organization and concepts of the Article with which the Bar is
familiar, nor the appropriate procedures for day to day opera-
tions under the Article, nor the result in terms of successful
perfection of security interests.
Second, the Committee was never dealing with a conflict of
interests between a tortfeasor or a criminal and his victim, be-
tween the bad man and the good man. The problems of choice
are always harder between two morally worthy men, each of
whom has legitimate interests to protect. While the members
of the sponsoring organizations sometimes are influenced by
familiar local rules and sometimes by knowledge of one side of
a problem on behalf of a client, they show remarkable willing-
ness to transcend these considerations and adhere to the collec-
tive judgment of their Reporters and Advisers (in this case, the
Committee and the Permanent Editorial Board). Mr. Leven-
berg, on the contrary, repeatedly sets up his individual judg-
ments against the collective view with little more than mere
assertion to support it.
References in the subheadings below are to the subdivisions
of Mr. Levenberg's article.
lI-A-Filing Procedures on Fixture Filings.
Mr. Levenberg argues that all fixture filings ought to be
made at the Secretary of State's office in a state, to eliminate
local filings. Certainly no lawyer with practical experience
could expect the real estate Bar to accept a suggestion that
every real property title search must be accompanied by a
search in the state capitol for fixture filings.
In footnote 12 the author asserts that the draftsmen "have
refused to provide a uniform definition of 'fixtures' .
He also asserts that the draftsmen have created pitfalls by
allowing the definition of fixtures to turn on state law. The
fact is that since Mr. Coogan suggested7 and Professor Gil-
more8 supported the idea of defining "fixture" and the present
7. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 1319, 1343-49 (1982).




writer questioned the feasibility of the idea,9 the question has
been under almost continous study by the Review Committee
and its predecessors. The Committee did attempt a definition
in its Preliminary Draft No. 1 of November 20, 1968.10 In Pre-
liminary Draft No. 2 of February 1, 1970,11 the Committee ex-
plained that this draft had turned out to be entirely too compli-
cated, largely because of the attempt to define "fixture". Pro-
fessor Braucher and I determined to jettison Preliminary Draft
No. 1 when we found that committees from the section on Real
Property of the American Bar Association and the American
Land Title Association did not understand it, despite their as-
siduous study. It is not now relevant to explain why the attempt
produced so much complication.1 2 Most writers would have ac-
cepted the Committee's view that the effort to define "fixture"
did not work.
II-B-Duration of Effectiveness of Financing Statements.
In a Committee statement it was explained that the five year
duration of filing was intended to make the files self-clearing
by permitting discard of those over five years old. Mr. Leven-
berg argues that this explanation loses its force when it is rec-
ognized that all financing statements are indexed alphabeti-
cally. 13 I doubt that Mr. Levenberg can assert of his own
knowledge that this form of indexing prevails in all 51 central
filing jurisdictions and in the perhaps 1000 local filing juris-
dictions. I know that he cannot assert that when the Code will
be 15 or 20 years old in each state and the sheer bulk of the
filings and indexes have become really burdensome, the states
will not utilize the technique built into the statute of permit-
ting the filings and the indexings to be arranged by year so that
the older ones can be automatically discarded. Even if there
were a single alphabetical index of financing statements, it
would not be any great problem to go through the index cards
once a year and discard those pages on which file numbers
9. Kripke, Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
COLuM. L. REv. 44, 62-65 (1964).
10. Reprinted in 24 Bus. LAW. 341 (1969). The present writer ex-
plained the complexities resulting from this attempt at definition in
Kripke, The Review Committee's Proposals to Amend the Fixture Pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 301, 304-05(1969).
11. Reprinted in 25 Bus. LAW. 1067 (1970).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. Levenberg, supra note 1, at 123.
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showed that they were more than five years old. When the
present Committee chose to retain this five year device, which
is built into the original Code and which is presently law, the
writer made contact with both the National Association of County
Recorders and Clerks and also with the Secretaries of State
Association and endeavored earnestly (but, I admit, without too
much success) to get some feedback on this very point. There
was no negative feedback either to the retention of the five
year device as impractical or even to the new provision that an
old financing statement kept alive by a continuation statement
should be physically carried forward with the continuation state-
ment to prevent destruction when the filings for the original
year were discarded.1 4
Here, as in so many places, Mr. Levenberg gives not the
slightest weight to the opinion of 10 experienced lawyers who
were members of the Committee and the specialists in the field
who acted as Reporters for and Consultants to the Committee.
The possibility that a differing consensus might be worthy of
consideration against his single judgment does not seem to enter
his calculations and certainly does not temper the vigor of his
assertions.
Il-C--Consequences of Lapsed Financing Statements.
Here Mr. Levenberg disagrees with the Committee's decision
that financing statements should not lapse during bankruptcy
proceedings. He argues that this was unnecessary because it is
an elementary rule of bankruptcy law that the filing of the pe-
tition operates as a freeze upon priorities as they exist on the
date of filing. It may be a rule of bankruptcy law, but it is not
that self-evident. On the very day that I read Mr. Leven-
berg's article I received a letter from an experienced lawyer who
acts as a bankruptcy trustee saying that he had this question
before him. He had seen the references to it in the Commit-
tee's discussion and requested help because he could not find
any authority on the subject. I believe that Mr. Levenberg is cor-
rect in his general statement of the law which the Committee
also so stated, but I do not believe that it is an elementary prin-
ciple. I was persuaded to deal with the subject in the Commit-
tee's drafts because I found a Referee in Bankruptcy holding the
contrary in a reported opinion.15
14. Final Report, supra note 2, at § 9-403(3).
15. The law is collected in 4A W. Coitur ON BANKRuPTcY § 70.81
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Mr. Levenberg declares that it is "pure folly" for the Com-
mittee to provide that when a senior security interest lapses,
junior interests rise to the top. This is, of course, a question on
which opinions may differ. Professor Gilmore, one of the out-
standing authorities in the field, differed with the Comments
on this point in the existing Code'0 and also differed with
the Committee's strengthening of that result in its redrafts. The
subject was intensely debated within the Committee. There def-
initely are two sides to the question. The present issue, how-
ever, is whether the pure folly is in the difficult choice made
by the Committee or in Mr. Levenberg's use of the quoted
phrase instead of letting his arguments stand on their merits.
II-D-Transfer of Collateral, Debtor's Change of Name and
Proper Name Under Which to File.
Another standard problem of choosing between competing
interests is to decide whether a secured party is under a duty
to refile when the debtor changes his name or the property is
transferred to a new debtor with the result that a search
against the present name of the person holding the property
would not reveal a security interest. Problems of this sort ob-
viously exist and have been debated for many years. The choice
is one on which the Committee was at first divided. I pre-
pared drafts reading the other way, which created new difficul-
ties. I know practicing lawyers who would prefer to have seen
the Committee make the other choice. The Committee reached
its conclusion against requiring refiling in large part on the
theory that some one about to make a new advance is alert to
the particular situation and can investigate the history of the
ownership of the property. In contrast, in today's frequent ex-
tensions of credit, once the loan is made it is handled by clerks
routinely without active participation of management personnel
or meaningful contact with the debtor. The significance of any
transfer or change of name is likely to be disregarded. Mr. Lev-
enberg asserts the contrary but does not explain from what
vantage point of experience he gets his information.
The Committee made an unclear situation certain by pro-
viding that filing in trade names of individuals is not effective
(6), at n.44 (14th ed. 1969). The erroneous referee's decision is In re
Sheets, 7 U.C.C. REP. 893 (W.D. Okla. 1970).




filing. It authorized extra filing in trade names where a credi-
tor prefers to be cautious rather than get into litigation. The
writer submits to the fair-minded reader whether there is jus-
tification for Mr. Levenberg's tone: "This hardly appears to
solve the confusion caused by the use of trade names." 17
Ill-Default Provisions.
Mr. Levenberg questions whether a consumer debtor should
be allowed to waive notice of a secured party's proposal to re-
tain the collateral in lieu of the sale which might result in a de-
ficiency. He seems to miss the point altogether. Obviously the
consumer would automatically get notice of the intention when
he signs the waiver. What he would be waiving is a waiting
period and there hardly seems to be any policy issue on this
point. Mr. Levenberg next objects because the Committee
shrinks the class of persons entitled to receive notice of the se-
cured party's proposal to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debt in lieu of sale. The notice would hereafter be given
only to junior interests (other than the debtor) who had informed
the secured party in writing of their interest before the secured
party gave his notice. Mr. Levenberg characterizes this time
period, i.e., the period before the secured party gives his own
notice so the latter does not have to keep on reopening his
own notice, as an "irrational time limit" and the Committee's
reduction of the class of persons entitled to notice as "devastat-
ing"; but he misunderstands the practical problem. A secured
party creates a security interest and, of course, thereafter
has no occasion to search the record for junior interests unless
the statute requires him to do so on default. If there arises
such a junior interest which has any serious hope of salvaging
anything from the value of the property, the holder of the junior
interest could, and normally would in prudent fashion, give
notice to the senior secured party of his interest as soon as it
arises. This would be sufficient to create for the secured party
a duty of giving notice of intention to retain the property in
satisfaction of the debt. Mr. Levenberg has dreamed up the
improbable situation of a junior secured party who comes into
the picture at the last possible minute after default and is
forced to run a race to serve notice of his existence before the
secured party gives notice of his intention to retain the collateral.
There might be such a case, but it is very hard to visualize one
17. Levenberg, supra note 1, at 129.
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where a legitimate secured party would come rushing in to
take a junior security interest when he had to race to give his
notice before the senior secured party (already in possession of
the collateral by assumption) acted to retain it in satisfaction of
an already defaulted debt.
Mr. Levenberg's lack of understanding of the problem makes
his strong phrases unjustifiable:
[I]t does not make sense to allow the senior easily to deprive
juniors of their right to object to the senior's retention of the
collateral. Juniors would be left to the mercy of the debtor to
protect them .... 18 [A]dvances of credit under junior se-
curity interests will be too hazardous .... 19 [T]he committee
has proposed notice procedures that permit seniors to seriously
harm juniors .... 20
IV-A-Conflict of Laws-Freedom to Choose Applicable Laws.
Mr. Levenberg's lengthy discussion of freedom of the parties
to choose applicable law is of some interest and has some sup-
port in other writings. It is difficult to determine whether he
intends to criticize the Final Report in its handling of this topic,
although he seems to be saying that the Committee reached ac-
ceptable results without knowing what it was doing. The
Comment which he quotes makes clear that the Committee
was referring more issues to the general conflict of laws
provision of Section 1-105 and fewer matters to what had been
the specific provisions of Sections 9-102 and 9-103 than does the
existing code. He might have given us credit for knowing that
Section 1-105 permits the parties to agree on governing law and
that the other sections cited do not mention the point. The topic
is an interesting illustration of the problems involved in partially
amending a uniform law.
The present general provisions have been severely criti-
cized, 21 but also defended. The Committee first deleted the lan-
guage in Section 9-102 which said that the statements as to scope
of subject matter apply "so far as concerns any personal prop-
erty and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state." Both
Professor Weintraub and Mr. Levenberg seem to agree that
this language was non-specific as to the time that the prop-
18. Id. at 133.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 134.




erty had to be within the jurisdiction.2 2  The Committee then
made various clarifications of Section 9-103, but limited that
section to questions of perfection, thus leaving all other ques-
tions, including validity and foreclosure questions, to the gen-
eral conflicts rules of Section 1-105. Leaving validity to gen-
eral rules was clearly justified because questions of validity in-
clude not only formalities, but also questions reflecting the fact
that a secured transaction secures an obligation whose validity
under rules relating to usury, infancy, etc., is not governed
by Article 9.
The general conflict section, Section 1-105, has been the
subject of a long debate and has recently again been criticized
as "bad enough ' 23 for permitting the parties to choose the appli-
cable law instead of being governed by the "center of gravity"
test. But the Committee, as stated, was not writing on a clean
slate: Section 1-105 presently is in the law, and portions of the
Code not directly affecting Article 9 were not within the refer-
ence to the Review Committee on Article 9. The Committee
was in active consultation as to these problems with Professor
Willis L.M. Reese, who was then just completing his work on
the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws. He, in espousing
the "center of gravity" test, had reached the conclusion that
with the widespread adoption of the Code, "the reasonable
relation" test in Section 1-105 (1), which would permit the parties
to agree on choice of law, and the "appropriate relation" test
which applies in the absence of agreement would both be influ-
enced by modern "center of gravity" theory.24  Thus, Section
1-105(1) seems to be becoming a restatement of the tendency of
the law toward a "center of gravity" resolution of conflicts
problems.25 The Committee's result was fully in accord with
the modern trend.
22. "The general choice-of-law provision for Article 9, contained
in section 9-102(1), should be repealed and not replaced." R. WmN-
TRAUB, supra note 21, at 373.
23. Id. at 353.
24. 2 REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 243, Introduc-
tion to Chapter 9, Topic 3 (Movables) at 64-65 (1971).
25. Compare Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70
YA L.J. 1037, 1044 (1961) on the extent to which earlier Uniform Acts
were treated merely as restatement of the common law. In Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 ILL. L. FoRum 321, 331, the present writer said:
It is fair to say that the draftsmen of the Code had an anticodi-
fication or antistatute predilection. They did not want to codify
the law, in the continental sense of codification. They wanted
to correct some false starts, to point the law in the indicated
1972]
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In so far as Professor Weintraub inveighs against the per-
mission granted by Section 1-105 for the parties to choose the
law instead of a "proper evaluation of relevant state policies, ' 20
it should be noted that the problem for commercial parties is one
thing and the problem for consumer questions is a different
thing. The Committee was drafting in the expectation that
this issue in the case of consumer matters would be taken out
of the Uniform Commercial Code pursuant to the Notes to Sec-
tions 9-102 and 9-203 and would be covered by such statutes as
Section 1-201 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or Sec-
tion 1-201 of the National Consumer Act, both of which prescribe
the governing law in a manner not subject to agreement (ex-
cept on very limited conditions) .27
Thus, it is not true as Mr. Levenberg contends, that we did
not know what we wrought, and my own view is that we
wrought pretty well.
IV-B--Conflict of Laws-The Place of Filing and the Law Gov-
erning Validity.
This was the field in which the Committee accepted Mr. Lev-
enberg's criticisms of its then existing draft; but he continues to
criticize the Committee's solution. He does not seem to contend
strongly that the Committee's test for what jurisdiction governs
is wrong, but he objects because the applicable section fails to
state that the filing required by that jurisdiction is within its
own bounds. He worries about the task of the lay credit man-
ager, not an attorney, who might not understand that if the
governing jurisdiction does not tell him to file elsewhere, the
filing which it requires is within its own state. This scarcely
needs comment. Where else would a layman expect to file ex-
cept in his own state, when he is told that his state law gov-
erns? At any rate, this is the plain meaning of the situation and
is made clear by Section 9-401(4) of the Final Draft which Mr.
Levenberg entirely overlooks. It reads: "The rules stated in
directions, and to restore the law merchant as an institution for
growth only lightly kept in bounds by statute.
26. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 21, at 356.
27. Moreover, we recognized that parties' selection would be sub-
ject to the doctrines of adhesion contracts and unconscionability in
consumer cases, possibly also in other appropriate cases. Compare
Id. at 274. Indeed, one of the major areas in which the concept of
adhesion contracts was first developed was precisely this question of
contracting for the appropriate law. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953).
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Section 9-103 determine whether filing is necessary in this
state." This makes it perfectly clear that when Section 9-103
determines that jurisdiction is in this state and does not pro-
vide a special filing rule, Section 9-401 of this state specifies
where to file in this state.
The Committee's test of the jurisdiction governing perfec-
tion problems is the law of the state where the last act occurs,
on which is based the assertion that the security interest is
perfected or unperfected. Perhaps it is my fault that Mr. Lev-
enberg, to criticize this, dreams up a case in which the collateral
moves from state to state and the secured party seizes on a state
with special non-uniform rules of priority and performs the last
act of perfection in that state. While we were in discussion in
the spring of 1971, I suggested a case of a race horse moving
from track to track in different states while negotiations for a
loan on the horse as security were under discussion. Perhaps
this inspired his assumption that any secured party would re-
sort to such Machiavellian tactics, especially since he recog-
nizes that there are presently no special non-uniform priority
rules to inspire departure from the usual principle that one
perfects as soon as possible.
TV-C and IV-D.
These points are principally exposition. In so far as they are
critical, much of the material is covered by the discussion of
TV-A and B above. The Committee has been congratulated by
many on its substantial clarification of Section 9-103. To date
only Mr. Levenberg finds that it failed in that respect.
V-Questions of Scope.
Under the present Code, an assignment for security of an
interest in a trust or estate appears to be an assignment of a
general intangible requiring filing; but many persons would not
realize that the assignment of these kinds of non-commercial col-
lateral is subject to Article 9. There have been experiences of
this kind. 28  The Committee decided that filing should not be
required. The Committee did not fail to realize that under this
rule a second possible assignee would lose the benefit of having
a place to search for notice of a first assignment. The ques-
28. Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Ill. App. 2d 243, 243 N.E.2d
501 (1968); Levine v. Pascal, 94 II1. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
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tion is to choose between two legitimate interests and the de-
cision ought not to be said that the Committee 20 "has cre-
ated an entrapment for bona fide purchasers." Assignments of
this kind of collateral for security, being non-commercial, are
rare enough. The number of cases of fraudulent double assign-
ments for security must be almost infinitesimal; surely the
Committee's decision to protect the first assignee from inadvert-
antly giving a windfall to a levying creditor or trustee in bank-
ruptcy is a correct judgment as against the theoretical fear of
harm to the rare second assignee.
There are other minor points which I have not dealt with.
It is not clear for instance, whether an assertion that "the Com-
mittee does not explain the purpose of the change from 'chief
place of business' to 'the jurisdiction in which the debtor is lo-
cated' "30 is intended as a criticism. I should have thought that
the purpose was obvious from the definition of location: the lo-
cation formula adopts chief place of business (now described as
"chief executive office") as the criterion where there is one,
but also provides an answer when the debtor is an individual
who has no place of business. There are other instances where
one cannot determine whether the provocative language is in-
tended as substantive criticism or is merely Mr. Levenberg's way
of writing and thinking. But I believe that the foregoing is suf-
ficient to point out that the article, if it is successful at all in
confusing the reader as to the merits of the Committee's Final
Report, has a done a great disservice to the law.
29. Levenberg, supra note 1, at 157.
30. Id. at 151.
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